An epistemic model of the uncertainty associated with vague concepts is introduced. Label semantics theory is proposed as a framework for quantifying an agent's uncertainty concerning what labels are appropriate to describe a given example. An interpretation of label semantics is then proposed which incorporates prototype theory by introducing uncertain thresholds on the distance between elements and prototypes for description labels. This interpretation naturally generates a functional calculus for appropriateness measures. A more general model with distinct threshold variables for different labels is discussed and we show how different kinds of semantic dependence can be captured in this model.
Introduction
Natural language is a powerful, flexible and robust mechanism for communicating ideas, concepts and information. Yet the meaning conveyed by even simple words is often inherently uncertain. This uncertainty is reflected in the variation and inconsistency in the use of words by different individuals. For example, Parikh [30] reports an experiment where a sample of people are shown a chart with different coloured squares and asked to count the number of red and the number of blue squares. The results differ significantly across the group. Similar inconsistencies in the use of colour categories are also described in the work of Belin and Kay [1] and Kintz et al. [20] . We believe that this uncertainty about the appropriate use of words arises as a natural consequence of the distributed and case-based manner by which an understanding of language is acquired.
Language is, to a large degree, learnt through the experience of our interactions with other speakers from which we can make inferences about the implicit rules and conventions of language use [29] . Exposure to formal grammar rules and explicit dictionary definitions comes relatively late in our education and requires a priori a basic vocabulary on the part of the student. It is perhaps not surprising then that such a process results in significant semantic uncertainty. We cannot realistically expect that the boundaries of linguistic concepts, as perhaps represented by their extensions in a multi-dimensional conceptual space [11] , should be precisely and unambiguously defined by a finite set of often conflicting examples. It is our view then, that the uncertainty about word meanings which naturally result from such an empirical learning process is the underlying source of concept vagueness. Consequently we adopt an epistemic perspective on vagueness, to some extent in accordance with the views of Williamson [37] , whereby crisp concept boundaries are assumed to exist but where their precise definition is uncertain. Furthermore, as pointed out by Parikh [29, 30] , empirical learning requires extrapolation from previously encountered examples of word use to other new but similar cases. Hence, the notion of similarity is also fundamental to any model of vagueness. Prototype theory [32, 33] provides a powerful tool to understand the role of typicality in concept definitions, resulting in a natural ordering on possible exemplars of concepts e.g. Bill is taller than Mary, but Mary is richer than Bill. In this paper we attempt to provide a formal framework for representing the epistemic uncertainty associated with vague concepts, which incorporates elements of prototype theory.
The modelling of concept vagueness in Artificial Intelligence has been dominated by ideas from fuzzy set theory as originally proposed by Zadeh [38] . In that approach the extension of a concept is represented by a fuzzy set which has a graded characteristic or membership function with values ranging between 0 and 1. This allows for intermediate membership (values in (0, 1)) in vague concepts resulting in intermediate truth values for propositions involving vague concepts (fuzzy logic). The calculus for fuzzy set theory is truth-functional which means that the full complement of Boolean laws cannot all be satisfied [4] . 1 Furthermore, fuzzy set theory and fuzzy logic do not in their narrowest manifestations adopt an epistemic view of vagueness. Hájek [14] , for example, argues that membership values of fuzzy categories are primitives quantifying gradedness of membership according to which it is meaningless to refer to unknown or uncertain crisp boundaries of vague concepts, since such boundaries are inherently fuzzy. On the other hand, many of the proposed interpretations of fuzzy sets implicitly adopt an epistemic position. In particular, the random set model of fuzzy sets (see [12, 13] and [27] ) according to which fuzzy set membership functions correspond to single point coverage functions of a random set, inherently assumes the existence of an uncertain but crisp set representing the extension of a vague concept. The basis of the label semantics theory [21] outlined in this paper is also a random set model of vagueness but where the intention is to quantify uncertainty concerning the applicability or appropriateness of labels to describe a given example. Such a theory cannot result in a truthfunctional calculus but can be functional in a weaker sense in the presence of certain assumptions concerning the semantic dependence between labels. A principal motivation for this paper is to explore the relationship between prototype theory and label semantics. Hence, there will be a focus on mathematical results demonstrating a clear link between these two theories in the case when categorization (labeling) involves thresholding of a measure of similarity to prototypes. Furthermore, we will argue from an Artificial Intelligence perspective, that the proposed framework could be a suitable model for rational intelligent agents who use concept labels and label expressions to describe elements of their environment with the aim of communicating information to their fellow agents.
An outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 describes a variant of the epistemic theory of vagueness which provides the philosophical underpinnings for the formal models we propose [23] . Section 3 provides an overview of label semantics as first proposed in [21] and [22] . Section 4 discusses the relationship between prototype theory, typicality, uncertainty and vagueness. Section 5 describes a new prototype theory interpretation of label semantics and finally Section 6 gives some conclusions and possible directions for future work.
An epistemic theory of vagueness
In our everyday use of language we are continually faced with decisions about the best way to describe objects and instances in order to convey the information we intend. For example, suppose you are witness to a robbery, how should you describe the robber so that police on patrol in the streets will have the best chance of spotting him? You will have certain labels that can be applied, for example tall, short, medium, fat, thin, blonde, etc., some of which you may view as inappropriate for the robber, others perhaps you think are definitely appropriate while for some labels you are uncertain whether they are appropriate or not. On the other hand, perhaps you have some ordered preferences between labels so that tall is more appropriate than medium which is in turn more appropriate than short. Your choice of words to describe the robber should surely then be based on these judgments about the appropriateness of labels. Yet where does this knowledge come from and more fundamentally what does it actually mean to say that a label is or is not appropriate? In the sequel we shall propose an interpretation of vague description labels based on a particular notion of appropriateness and suggest a measure of subjective uncertainty resulting from an agent's partial knowledge about what labels are appropriate to assert. Furthermore, we will suggest that the vagueness of these description labels lies fundamentally in the uncertainty about if and when they are appropriate as governed by the rules and conventions of language use.
It seems undeniable that humans posses some kind of mechanism for deciding whether or not to make certain assertions (e.g. 'The robber is blonde') or to agree to a classification (e.g. 'Yes he was tall'). Furthermore, although the underlying concepts are often vague the decisions about assertions are, at a certain level, bivalent. That is to say for a particular example x and description θ , you are either willing to assert that 'x is θ ' or not. Of course in general this decision may depend on many factors associated with the context in which the communication is taking place. For example, you are likely to be much more cautious in your use of language when describing a robber to the police than in describing a colleague to a close friend. Also, your motives may be much more complex than purely to communicate information. For example, you may have recognized the robber as a family member so that your aim when describing him is to throw the police off the scent. Nonetheless, there seems to be an underlying assumption that some things can be correctly asserted while others cannot. Exactly where the dividing line lies between those labels that are and those that are not appropriate to use may be uncertain, but the assumption that such a division exists would be a natural precursor to any decision making process of the kind just described.
The above argument brings us very close to the epistemic view of vagueness as expounded by Timothy Williamson [37] . Williamson assumes that for the extensions of a vague concept there is a precise but unknown dividing boundary between it and the extension of the negation of that concept. For example, consider the set of heights which are classified as being tall, then there is according to the epistemic view a precise but unknown height for which all values less than this height are not tall while all those greater than it are tall. From this viewpoint Sorities problems are resolved by denying the assumption that practically indistinguishable elements satisfy the same vague predicates. Hence, for a finite sequence of increasing heights x i : i = 1, . . . ,k where x 1 is not tall, x k is tall and x i+1 − x i , for some very small positive number , it holds that: ∃i for which 'x i is not tall' and 'x i+1 is tall'. Although the exact value of i will be virtually impossible for anyone to identify precisely.
The epistemic stance
While there are marked similarities between the epistemic view and that proposed in this paper, there are also some important differences. For instance, the epistemic view would seem to assume the existence of some objectively correct, but unknown, set of criteria for determining whether or not a given instance satisfies a vague concept. Instead of this we argue that individuals when faced with decision problems regarding assertions find it useful as part of a decision making strategy to assume that there is a clear dividing line between those labels which are and those which are not appropriate to describe a given instance. In other words, in deciding what to assert agents behave as if the epistemic view of vagueness is correct. We refer to this strategic assumption across a population of communicating agents as the epistemic stance [22, 23] , a concise statement of which is as follows:
Each individual agent in the population assumes the existence of a set of labeling conventions, valid across the whole population, governing what linguistic labels and expressions can be appropriately used to describe particular instances.
In practice these rules and conventions underlying the appropriate use of labels would not be imposed by some outside authority. In fact, they may not exist at all in a formal sense. Rather they are represented as a distributed body of knowledge concerning the assertability of predicates in various cases, shared across a population of agents, and emerging as the result of interactions and communications between individual agents all adopting the epistemic stance. The idea is that the learning processes of individual agents, all sharing the fundamental aim of understanding how words can be appropriately used to communicate information, will eventually converge to some degree on a set of shared conventions. The very process of convergence then to some extent vindicates the epistemic stance from the perspective of individual agents. Of course, this is not to suggest complete or even extensive agreement between individuals as to these appropriateness conventions. However, the overlap between agents should be sufficient to ensure the effective transfer of useful information. Indeed, such effective communication does not require perfect agreement. For example, [30] illustrates how two individuals with different notions of the colour blue can still effectively use the concept to pass information between them, by considering how the search space of one person looking for a book required by the other is reduced when they learn that the book is blue.
In many respects our view is quite close to that of Rohit Parikh [29, 30] where he argues for an anti-representational view of vagueness, focusing on the notion of assertability rather than that of truth. Parikh argues that it is almost unavoidable that different speakers will use the same predicate in different ways because of the manner in which language is learnt. Since vague predicates lack a clear definition we tend to learn the 'usage of these words in some few cases and then we extrapolate'. With reference to Dewey and Wittgenstein, Parikh argues for a view of language where truth is relatively unimportant, but where communication is best thought of in terms of a set of social practices. What is important then is not whether a particular expression is true but whether it is assertible. To quote Parikh directly:
"Certain sentences are assertible in the sense that we might ourselves assert them and other cases of sentences which are non-assertible in the sense that we ourselves (and many others) would reproach someone who used them. But there will also be the intermediate kind of sentences, where we might allow their use." Hence, the epistemic stance requires that agents make decisions on what is or is not appropriate to assert, based on their past experience of language use and on the assumption that there are existing linguistic conventions that should be adhered to if they do not wish to be misunderstood or contradicted. This decision problem would naturally lead agents to consider their subjective beliefs concerning the appropriateness of the available description labels in a given context. Uncertainty about such beliefs could then be quantified by using subjective probabilities, as proposed originally by de Finetti [3] and Ramsey [31] for other types of epistemic uncertainty. In the next section we introduce label semantics as a subjective probability based model of an agent's uncertainty about the appropriateness of expressions to describe a given instance, consistent with them adopting the epistemic stance.
To summarize, both the epistemic theory and the theory outlined in this paper identify vagueness as being a type of ignorance. For the epistemic theory this ignorance concerns the objective (but partially unknown) boundaries of concepts. While in our approach the focus is on an individual agent's ignorance of the underlying linguistic conventions governing the use of concept labels as part of communications between agents. In both cases, the association of vagueness with ignorance strongly contrasts with the many-valued/fuzzy logic approach in which the applicability of concept labels is viewed as being a matter of degree. Over recent years an extensive literature has emerged focusing on logical aspects of the fuzzy approach [14, 28] , including for example, embedding probability theory within a many-valued logic framework [9] . This work, however, is not within the scope of our paper.
The label semantics framework
Label semantics proposes two fundamental and inter-related measures of the appropriateness of labels as descriptions of an object or value. Given a finite set of labels LA a set of compound expressions LE can then be generated through recursive applications of logical connectives. The labels L i ∈ LA are intended to represent words such as adjectives and nouns which can be used to describe elements from the underlying universe Ω. In other words, L i correspond to description labels for which the expression 'x is L i ' is meaningful for any x ∈ Ω. This is exactly the type of expressions that Zadeh considers in his work in linguistic variables [40] [41] [42] . For example, if Ω is the set of all possible rgb values then LA could consist of the basic colour labels such as red, yellow, green, orange etc. In this case LE then contains those compound expression such as red & yellow, not blue nor orange etc. Note that in contrast to Kit Fine [8] in his discussion of penumbral connections we do not make the a priori assumption that the labels LA are mutually exclusive and exhaustive. This potentially allows for compound expressions such as red & orange to explicitly refer to boundaries between labels. The measure of appropriateness of an expression θ ∈ LE as a description of instance x is denoted by μ θ (x) and quantifies the agent's subjective belief that θ can be used to describe x based on his/her (partial) knowledge of the current labeling conventions of the population.
From an alternative perspective, when faced with an object to describe, an agent may consider each label in LA and attempt to identify the subset of labels that are appropriate to use. Let this set be denoted by D x . In the face of their uncertainty regarding labeling conventions the agent will also be uncertain as to the composition of D x , and in label semantics this is quantified by a probability mass function m x : 2 LA → [0, 1] on subsets of labels. The relationship between these two measures will be described below.
Definition 1 (Label expressions).
Given a finite set of labels LA the corresponding set of label expressions LE is defined recursively as follows:
•
The mass function m x on sets of labels then quantifies the agent's belief that any particular subset of labels contains all and only the labels with which it is appropriate to describe x i.e. m x (F ) is the agent's subjective probability that D x = F .
Definition 2 (Mass function on labels)
. ∀x ∈ Ω a mass function on labels is a function m x :
The appropriateness measure, μ θ (x), and the mass function m x are then related to each other on the basis that asserting
In general we can recursively define a mapping λ : LE → 2
2
LA from expressions to sets of subsets of labels, such that the assertion 'x is θ ' directly implies the constraint D x ∈ λ(θ) and where λ(θ) is dependent on the logical structure of θ . For example, if LA = {low, medium, high} then λ(medium∧¬high) = {{low, medium}, {medium}} corresponding to those sets of labels which include medium but do not include high.
LA is defined recursively as follows: ∀θ, ϕ ∈ LE
Based on the λ mapping we then define μ θ (x) as the sum of m x over those set of labels in λ(θ).
Definition 4 (Appropriateness measure).
The appropriateness measure defined by mass function m x is a function μ :
where μ θ (x) is used as shorthand notation for μ(θ, x).
Note that in label semantics there is no requirement for the mass associated with the empty set to be zero. Instead, m x (∅) quantifies the agent's belief that none of the labels are appropriate to describe x. We might observe that this phenomena occurs frequently in natural language, especially when labeling perceptions generated along some continuum. For example, we occasionally encounter colours for which none of our available colour descriptors seem appropriate. Hence, the value m x (∅) is an indicator of the describability of x in terms of the labels LA. Semantic relations | meaning 'more specific than' and ≡ meaning 'equivalent to' can be defined on LE in the classical manner. Let Val be the set of valuation functions v : LA → {0, 1} where for
is appropriate in the current context. In particular, the epistemic stance dictates that for each x ∈ Ω there would be a corresponding valuation v x (partially unknown to the agent) determining which labels are appropriate to describe x. A valuation v ∈ Val naturally determines an extension v : LE → {0, 1} defined recursively as follows:
We can now define | and ≡ as follows:
• θ is a tautology if ∀v ∈ Val v(θ ) = 1.
• θ is a contradiction if ∀v ∈ Val v(θ ) = 0.
Given Definitions 4 and 5 it can be shown that appropriateness measures have the following general properties [21, 22] : Theorem 6 (General properties of appropriateness measures). ∀θ, ϕ ∈ LE the following properties hold:
From Theorem 6 it can be seen that for a fixed x ∈ Ω, appropriateness measures correspond to probabilities on LE. More specifically, μ θ (x) can be interpreted as the subjective conditional probability that θ is an appropriate expression given that the element x is being described [21, 22] . This naturally links label semantics to the conditional probability interpretation of fuzzy sets proposed by Hisdal [19] and widely developed by Coletti and Scozzafava [2] . However, as we will see in the following section, the mass function based definition of appropriateness measures enables us to explore links with random set theory and to formulate certain consonance assumptions in a straightforward manner. The random set approach is also well suited to exploring the link between label semantics and prototype theory as shown in Section 5.
Functionality of appropriateness measures
From Definition 4 we see that in order to be able to evaluate the appropriateness measure of any expression θ ∈ LE as a description for x ∈ Ω we must potentially know the value of m x for all subsets of LA. Hence, we are, in principle, required to specify of order 2 |LA| − 1 values for m x . For large basic label sets this is clearly computationally infeasible. One solution to this problem would be to make additional assumptions about the definition of the mass assignment m x so that there exists a functional relationship between the appropriateness measure for the basic labels (i.e. μ L (x): L ∈ LA) and m x . This would result in a functional calculus for appropriateness measures according to which the appropriateness of any compound expression could be determined directly from the appropriateness of the basic labels in the following sense:
Now fuzzy logic is clearly functional in the sense of Definition 7 but it also satisfies the stronger property of truthfunctionality. Truth-functionality defines the mapping f θ to be a recursive combination of functions representing each connective, as determined by the logical structure of the expression θ . More formally:
Definition 8 (Truth-functional measures).
A measure μ : LE × Ω → [0, 1]
is said to truth-functional if there exists mappings
Now from Theorem 6 it follows that appropriateness measures must satisfy the laws of excluded middle and idempotence. Hence, by the following theorem due to Dubois and Prade [4] they cannot be truth-functional except in the trivial case where all appropriateness values are either 0 or 1. [4] .) If μ : LE × Ω → [0, 1] is a truth-functional measure and satisfies both idempotence and the law of excluded middle then ∀θ ∈ LE, ∀x ∈ Ω, μ θ (x) ∈ {0, 1}.
Theorem 9. (See Dubois and Prade
However, Theorem 9 does not apply to all functional measures, only those which are truth-functional, hence it may still be possible to define a functional calculus for appropriateness measures consistent with both Definitions 4 and 7. To investigate this possibility further we consider the relationship between appropriateness measures of compound expressions and those of the basic labels, imposed by Definition 4.
From Definition 3 the lambda mapping for a basic label L i ∈ LA is given by λ(L i ) = {F ⊆ LA: L i ∈ F } and hence the mass function m x must satisfy the following constraint imposed by the appropriateness measures for the basic labels μ L i (x):
This constraint, however, is not sufficient to identify a unique mass function
there are in general an infinite set of mass functions satisfying the above equation for a given set of basic label appropriateness values. Hence, in this context, the assumption of a functional calculus for appropriateness measures is equivalent to the assumption of a selection function which identifies a unique mass function from this set [21, 22] .
Definition 10 (Selection function). Let M be the set of all mass functions on 2
LA . Then a selection function is a function
Now since the value of μ θ (x) for any expression θ ∈ LE can be evaluated directly from m x , then given a selection function η we have a functional method for determining μ θ (x) from the basic label appropriateness values, where f θ in Definition 7 is given by:
Two examples of selection functions are the consonant and the independent selection functions as defined below:
. . ,n then the consonant selection function identifies the mass function,
The consonant selection function corresponds to the assumption that for each x ∈ Ω an agent first identifies a total ordering on the appropriateness of labels. They then evaluate their belief values m x about which labels are appropriate to describe x in such a way so as to be consistent with this ordering. More formally, let x denote the appropriateness ordering on LA for element x so that L 1 x L 2 means that L 2 is at least as appropriate as L 1 for describing x. When evaluating m x (F ) for F ⊆ LA the agent then makes the assumption that the mass value is non-zero only if for every label
The independent selection function simply assumes that when judging the appropriateness of a label an agent does not take into account the level of appropriateness of any other label. Although this may seem difficult to justify, it could be reasonable in cases where labels relate to different facets of the object. For example, the appropriateness of the label thin might well be assumed to be independent of the appropriateness of the label rich.
The following theorems show that the consonant and independent selection functions result in familiar combination operators for restricted sets of expressions (see [21, 22] ). [21, 36] .) Let LE ∧,∨ ⊆ LE denote those expressions generated recursively from LA using only the connectives ∧ and ∨.
Theorem 13. (See
One interpretation of selection functions is that they provide a means of encoding the semantic dependence between labels. From this perspective, the consonant selection function assumes that the appropriateness of all labels are assessed on the basis of the same set of shared attributes i.e. that they can be represented within a single conceptual space [11] . Typical examples might be height labels such as tall, medium and short or colour labels. Alternatively, the independent selection function assumes a set of labels where the appropriateness of each label is judged on the basis of a set of attributes independent from those employed to assess the appropriateness of any other label i.e. we have a set of independent conceptual spaces (one for each label) with no shared or dependent attributes. Intermediate cases between the consonant and independent selection functions can also be considered, perhaps resulting in the kind of partial orderings on appropriateness proposed in [23] . We shall return to the discussion of semantic dependence in the sequel where we will consider the issue from a prototype theory perspective.
Assertability decisions
For any given x ∈ Ω and expression θ ∈ LE it remains unclear exactly how an agent would use their evaluation of the appropriateness measure μ θ (x) in order to reach a decision as to whether or not the statement 'x is θ ' is assertible. One possibility would be to use a threshold based approach according to which a positive decision to assert 'x is θ ' would require that the appropriateness measure μ θ (x) be sufficiently close to 1. More formally, an agent would be willing to assert 'x is θ ' at certainty level α 0.5, denoted Assert α (x is θ), if μ θ (x) α. For a tautology θ ∨ ¬θ we would then have Assert α (x is θ ∨ ¬θ) holding at any certainty level α. However, for α max(μ θ (x), 1 − μ θ (x)) neither 'x is θ ' nor 'x is ¬θ ' is assertible at certainty level α i.e. Assert α (x is θ) ∨ Assert α (x is ¬θ) does not hold. This is consistent with the intuition that, for example, an agent would happily concede that any given colour is either red or not red even though for certain borderline cases they would be unwilling to use either the description red or the description not red. In general, for x ∈ Ω and expressions θ, ϕ ∈ LE Assert α (x is θ ∨ ϕ) is not equivalent to Assert α (x is θ) ∨ Assert α (x is ϕ) since the former requires that μ θ∨ϕ (x) α while the latter requires that max(μ θ (x), μ ϕ (x)) α. Indeed, if the consonant selection function is applied it can be seen from Theorem 13 that these two assertability statements are only equivalent for expressions θ and ϕ which do not involve negation i.e. θ, ϕ ∈ LE ∧,∨ .
Notice that although μ θ (x) is an indication of the assertability of the statement 'x is θ ' it should not be interpreted as the probability that this assertion will actually occur during communications aimed at describing x. Instead, μ θ (x) quantifies the belief that the expression θ is appropriate to describe x, where appropriateness is judged purely on the basis of the agent's interpretation of the meaning of θ . This understanding of meaning would in turn be based on an internal representation 2 of the labels in LA, as inferred from the agent's past experience of communications involving these labels. This is not the same as taking μ θ (x) as corresponding to the probability of assertion 'x is θ ' actually occurring. For example, given a basic label L i ∈ LA then from a semantic perspective the expressions L i and ¬¬L i are equally appropriate to describe any given x (with equal appropriateness measures). However, for those x with high appropriateness measures for these equivalent expressions, the assertion 'x is L i ' is perhaps much more likely to be actually used than the assertion 'x is ¬¬L i ', for reasons of syntactic simplicity. Indeed, Lawry [24] proposes a model for evaluating the probability of assertions, based on appropriateness measures, which takes into account a prior weighting on expressions dependent, for example, on their relative syntactic complexity. This, however, is beyond the scope of the current paper.
Prototype theory and vagueness
The central tenet of Prototype theory (Rosch [32, 33] ) is that concepts, rather than being defined by formal rules or mappings, are represented by prototypes and that categorization is based on similarity to these prototypes (see Hampton [15] for an overview). By taking typicality to be a decreasing function of distance from prototypes, this approach would naturally explain the fact that some instances are seen as being more typical exemplars of a concept than others. For example, robins are more typical exemplars of birds than penguins, since the latter have certain atypical characteristics such as the inability to fly. This notion of typicality is also strongly related to concept vagueness where borderline cases have an intermediate range of typicality values. In other words, such cases are not sufficiently similar to the concept prototypes to be judged as having certain membership in the category but are also not sufficiently dissimilar to the prototypes to be ruled as being certainly outside the category.
Gärdenfors [11] has recently introduced the notion of conceptual spaces for concept representation, corresponding to a metric space of (possibly) dependent attributes or features of elements from the underlying universe Ω. For example, the NCS colour spindle [35] is a proposed conceptual space for colour categories based on polar attributes Hue and Chromaticness and where Chromaticness is constrained by a third attribute, Intensity (see Fig. 1 ). Within a conceptual space properties are represented by convex regions. This provides a natural link to prototype theory since given a convex set of prototypes for each property the space is partitioned into convex regions each defined as the set of points closest to the prototypes for a given property. Such partitions are referred to as Voronoi tessellations. Similarity to prototypes has been widely suggested as a possible basis for membership functions in fuzzy logic. Dubois and Prade [6] and also Dubois et al. [7] identify such an interpretation as one of the three main semantics for membership degrees. For example, Ruspini [34] introduces a semantics for fuzzy reasoning where, given a measure of similarity between elements with a range between 0 (totally dissimilar) and 1 (totally similar), the membership degree of an element x in a concept corresponds to the supremum of the similarity values between x and the prototypes for the concept. Hampton [16] proposed a thresholding model for categorization whereby an instance is positively classified as belonging to a category if its similarity to the prototypes of that category exceeds a certain threshold. In the sequel we demonstrate the relationship between label semantics and exactly such a thresholding model.
A prototype theory interpretation of label semantics
In this interpretation it is proposed that the basic labels in LA correspond to natural categories each with an associated set of prototypes. A label L is then deemed to be an appropriate description of an element x ∈ Ω provided that x is sufficiently similar to the prototypes for L. The requirement of being 'sufficiently similar' is clearly imprecise and is modelled here by introducing an uncertain threshold on distance from prototypes. In keeping with the epistemic stance this uncertainty is assumed to be probabilistic in nature. In other words, an agent believes that there is some optimal threshold of this kind according to which he or she is best able to abide by the conventions of language when judging the appropriateness of labels. However, the agent is uncertain as to exactly what this threshold should be and instead defines a probability distribution on potential threshold values. Notice that the idea of an uncertain threshold fits well with the epistemic theory of vagueness since it naturally results in uncertain (but crisp) concept boundaries. Although, as discussed in Section 2, the assumption of an unknown objective definition of the concept is not required. Instead within such a model the agent's knowledge of the threshold probability distribution and also of the label prototypes would be derived from their experience of language use across a population of communicating agents each adopting the epistemic stance. 
In this section we begin by introducing a special case of the prototype model that results in a calculus for appropriateness measures consistent with the consonant selection function (Definition 11). We then propose a more general theory which can represent a range of semantic dependencies between labels.
A consonant model
Suppose that a distance function
This function is then extended to sets of elements such that for S, T ⊆ Ω, d(S, T ) = inf{d(x, y): x ∈ S and y ∈ T }. For each label L i ∈ LA let there be a set P i ⊆ Ω corresponding to prototypical elements for which L i is certainly an appropriate description. Within this framework L i is deemed to be appropriate to describe an element x ∈ Ω provided x is sufficiently close or similar to a prototypical element in P i . This is formalized by the requirement that x is within a maximal distance threshold
e. L i is appropriate to describe x if d(x, P i )
where 0. From this perspective an agent's uncertainty regarding the appropriateness of a label to describe a value x is characterised by his or her uncertainty regarding the distance threshold . In fact, it is also possible that an agent could be uncertain regarding the definition of the prototype sets P i . However, for this paper we make the simplification assumption that no uncertainty is associated with the prototypes. Here we assume that is a random variable and that the uncertainty is represented by a probability density function δ for defined on [0, ∞). 4 Within this interpretation a natural definition of the complete description of an element D x and the associated mass function m x can be given as follows:
Intuitively speaking D x identifies the set of labels with prototypes lying within of x. Fig. 2 shows D x in a hypothetical conceptual space as varies. Notice that the sequence D x as varies generates a nested hierarchy of label sets. Furthermore, the distance metric d naturally generates a total ordering on the appropriateness of labels for any element x, according to which label L j is as least as appropriate to describe x as label L i if x is closer (or equidistant) to P j than to
Also notice from Definition 15, that for
LA then μ L i (x) corresponds to the single point coverage function 6 of D x . This provides us with a link to the random set interpretation of fuzzy sets (see [6, 7, 12, 13, 27] ) except that in this case the random set maps to sets of labels rather than sets of elements. Hence, the interpretation of label semantics as proposed above provides a link between random set theory and prototype theory. A further consequence of this relationship with random set theory is that ∀x ∈ Ω, the mass function m x must satisfy the conditions given in Definition 11. This follows from the well-known fact that the mass function of a nested (or consonant) finite random set, in this case D x , can be determined uniquely from its single point coverage function (see [22] for an exposition).
The following results show how the appropriateness of an expression θ ∈ LE to describe an element x is equivalent to a constraint ∈ I(θ, x), for a measurable subset I(θ, x) of [0, ∞) defined as follows:
3 d may also be a distance metric if it satisfies the triangular inequality ∀x, y, z ∈ Ω d(x, z) d(x, y) + d( y, z), but this is not strictly required. 4 Even though is a random variable there is no suggestion of any underlying stochastic process. Instead an agent's uncertainty concerning is epistemic in nature and dependent on their experience of language use as discussed in Section 2.1. 5 For Lebesgue measurable set I , we denote δ(I) = I δ( ) d i.e. we also use δ to denote the probability measure induced by density function δ. 6 For a finite random set S into 2 U , where U is the underlying finite universe, the associate mass function m : 2 U → [0, 1] is such that for T ⊆ U , m(T ) is the probability that S = T . The single point coverage function then corresponds to the probability that z ∈ S, for z ∈ U , and is given by T : z∈T m(T ). In label semantics U = LA and S = D x . Definition 16. ∀x ∈ Ω and θ ∈ LE, I(θ, x) ⊆ [0, ∞) is defined recursively as follows: ∀θ, ϕ ∈ LE
We now prove the result by induction on k.
Step: Assume true for k For Φ ∈ LE (k+1) either Φ ∈ LE (k) , in which case the result holds trivially by the inductive hypothesis, or one of the following holds:
• Furthermore, in the case that we restrict ourselves to expressions in LE ∧,∨ (Theorem 13) the following result shows that I(θ, x) simply identifies a lower bound on . , x), lb(ϕ, x) ).
Definition 19. We define
We now prove the result by induction on k. , x), lb(ϕ, x) ), ∞) = [lb(θ ∨ ϕ, x), ∞) as required. 2 
I(L i
The associated mass function m 4.5 is then given by 
Neighbourhoods of prototypes
Another perspective on the prototype theory view of label semantics results from considering the set of elements from Ω which can be appropriately described by a label or expression. For an expression θ ∈ LE this subset of Ω would, in effect, correspond to the extension of the concept represented by θ . Now for the model proposed in Section 5.1 the set of elements which can be appropriately described by a label L i ∈ LA corresponds to the neighbourhood of P i (see Fig. 7) defined by:
This can be naturally extended to any label expression θ ∈ LE as follows:
The following theorem shows that N θ can be determined recursively from neighbourhoods N L i for the basic labels
Theorem 24. ∀x ∈ Ω, ∀θ, ϕ ∈ LE, ∀ ∈ [0, ∞) the following hold:
Proof. 
Proof.
Theorem 25 provides us with an alternative characterisation of appropriateness measure μ θ (x) as the single point coverage function of the random set neighbourhood N θ . Again this shows a link with the work of Goodman and Nguyen (see [12, 13] and [27] ) and their proposed interpretation of fuzzy sets as single point coverage functions of random sets.
The following theorem shows that for expressions θ not involving negation the random set neighbourhood N θ is nested.
For expressions θ / ∈ LE ∧,∨ it is not in general the case that N θ forms a nested sequence as varies. For example, consider the expression L i ∧ ¬L j and suppose there are elements x, y ∈ Ω together with real values > > 0 such that
In fuzzy set theory the idea of α-cuts is frequently applied in order to extend classical methods to the fuzzy case [5] . The α-cut of a fuzzy set A, denoted A α , is given by the set of domain elements with membership in A greater than or equal to α. In label semantics there is a analogous idea where the α-cut of an expression θ ∈ LE is given by the set of elements of Ω for which the appropriateness measure of θ is greater than or equal to α i.e. θ α = {x ∈ Ω: μ θ (x) α}. 7 In the following we show that, provided δ satisfies certain smoothness conditions, then there is a direct mapping between the α-cuts θ α and the neighbourhoods N θ for expressions θ ∈ LE ∧,∨ . , P i ) ). This suggests a strong relationship with the threshold model proposed by Hampton [16] to explain the relationship between the typicality of an instance in a category (as proportional to its similarity to a set of prototypes) and its membership in that category. Specifically, Hampton proposed that the membership of an instance in a category L should be defined as a function m of the similarity of the instance to the prototypes of L, and where m is an increasing function into [0, 1]. Clearly if we replace similarity with distance from prototypes this would naturally suggest that membership should be a decreasing function m of distance into [0, 1], as is consistent with label semantics prototype model where m = . Interestingly, re-analysing an experiment of McCloskey and Glucksberg [25] , Hampton [16, 17] required subjects to make binary categorization decisions for 482 items into 17 categories. They also independently made assessments of typicality. Category membership was then taken as corresponding to the probability of a positive categorization. In general, the results were consistent with a threshold model where m was a cumulative normal distribution. 8 Notice, also that if δ is assumed to be a normalised normal distribution (as in Example 22) Proof.
Definition 27. Let
In [5] the use of α-cuts is proposed as a method for extending set functions to fuzzy sets. Given a set function f : 2 Ω → R and a fuzzy set A on Ω the value f (A) is defined by:
This is the expected value of f (A α ) assuming a uniform distribution α. However, no clear justification is given in [5] as to why α should be uniformly distributed. Now the concept of prototype neighbourhoods suggests a method for extending set functions to expressions in LE by taking the expected value f (N θ ) as follows:
From Corollary 30 we that, for the restricted class of expressions LE ∧,∨ , this is equivalent to: 8 In the case of biological categories, there was also evidence that categorization probability was also affected by non-similarity based knowledge e.g.
where an animal looked superficially like one category but was actually in another.
In other words, we see from Corollary 30 that whatever the distribution δ on , a uniform distribution should be selected when averaging over α-cuts of expressions in LE ∧,∨ .
Domain information from vague expressions
One of the principle uses of vague concepts in language is to convey information about the underlying universe Ω in specific cases or contexts. Parikh [30] gives the example of two college lecturers Ann and Bob, where Ann asks Bob to bring in her blue book from her library at home. How can Bob use the information that the 'book is blue' to restrict the possible books of interest? The prototype interpretation of label semantics naturally suggests an imprecise restriction on the domain Ω imposed by a constraint 'x is θ ' where θ ∈ LE. Specifically, given the information 'x is θ ' then, provided θ is not a contradiction, an agent infers that x ∈ N θ and consequently that N θ = ∅. From the latter inference the agent naturally generates a posterior distribution δ θ on conditional on the information that the neighbourhood of θ is non-empty, where: 
The single point coverage function of the random set in Definition 31 then indicates the probability that a value x ∈ Ω is a possible referent in the assertion 'x is θ ':
Notice, from Theorem 26, that in the case of θ ∈ LE ∧,∨ then N θ is nested and therefore spc θ (x) is a possibility distribution on Ω. Hence, for this restricted set of expressions our approach is in accordance with that of Zadeh [39] who argues that fuzzy information generates possibilistic constraints on the underlying domain of discourse. 
A general model
Notice from Definition 32 that if δ i denotes the marginal density of i derived from joint density δ then the appropriateness measure for label L i ∈ LA can be evaluated directly from δ i according to:
The joint density δ encodes dependencies between the random variables i which in turn reflect semantic dependencies between the labels. For the consonant model we have total dependence where d i = d and i = for all L i ∈ LA. This suggests that the labels in LA all describe the same characteristic of the elements in Ω as represented by attribute values in a single conceptual space. Typical examples where such a dependent model may be appropriate are colour labels based on attributes from a multi-dimensional space such as the so-called colour spindle [11] or on rgb values. Other examples include labels for one-dimensional characteristics such height, weight, income and, of course, number of hairs on your head. The following variant on the approach proposed in Section 5.1 also results in a consonant model but where there is variation in scale between the threshold variables i . 
A general consonant model
. For example, the label navy blue is a restriction of the label blue in this sense. In such cases L j is an appropriate description whenever L i is appropriate and ∀x ∈ Ω μ ¬L i ∨L j (x) = 1.
Notice that one simple case of nested labels is where P i ⊆ P j and f i f j . In this case sup{d(x, P j ): 
An independence model
Clearly we see from Theorem 34 that the assumption of independence between i : L i ∈ LA results in a model consistent with the independent selection function (Definition 12). This type of model would seem to be relevant in the case where different labels refer to different independent characteristics of the elements in Ω. For example, if Ω corresponds to a set of people, then judgments concerning the appropriateness of labels rich and tall would be made on the basis of independent metrics comparing people in terms of their wealth and their height respectively.
Semantic dependence
Semantic dependence between labels as modelled by the joint distribution δ on i : L i ∈ LA captures the relationship between the various characteristics described by the different labels in LA. If all labels describe the same characteristic of elements in Ω, as represented by vectors of attribute values in a shared conceptual space, then an assumption of strong semantic dependence such as in the consonant model or the general consonant model (Section 5.4.1) is appropriate. On the other hand, if each label refers to a different characteristic as represented by points in distinct independent conceptual spaces then an assumption of independence between i , as in Section 5.4.2, is valid. For more diverse label sets LA, we would expect there to be more complex dependencies between i : L i ∈ LA than the two extreme cases described above.
For example, the characteristics described by different labels may have conceptual spaces which, while not being identical, have attributes in common or which have dependencies between attributes. It is certainly not the case that every joint distribution δ will result in a selection function as given in Definition 10, and hence the resulting calculus for appropriateness measures may not be functional. In such cases it would be interesting to investigate the use of graphical models such as Bayesian Networks to represent the dependencies between the different threshold variables. However, this possibility is beyond the scope this paper and remains to be explored as part of future work.
Discussion of the label semantics prototype model
Typically in prototype theory the prototypes are not necessarily seen as corresponding to actual examples experienced by the agent but instead as abstractions derived from experience (see Hampton [15] ). This is in keeping with many unsupervised learning algorithms where class labels based on clusters are represented by centroids aggregated from actual data. Alternatively, exemplar models (Medin and Shaffer [26] ) are a variant on prototype theory where agents have a memory store consisting of actually encountered exemplars of particular description labels. The k-nearest neighbours algorithm is an obvious example of a classification method based on this philosophy. Now the application of prototype theory in this paper does not depend on any distinction between actual exemplars and abstractions provided both are members of the underlying space Ω. Consequently, the label semantics approach can be applied to both variants of prototype theory.
The model presented in Section 5 defines prototypes only for the basic labels LA and not for general compound expressions in LE − LA. For expression θ ∈ LE − LA the neighbourhood N θ is defined recursively on the basis of distance from prototypes for the labels which occur in θ rather than being based on distance from a set of prototypes for θ itself. This is consistent with the underlying philosophy of label semantics which assumes that the labels LA represent primitive concepts and that the appropriateness of compound expressions is derived as a function only of the appropriateness of these labels. Indeed there is a close analogy here with the distinction that Gärdenfors [11] draws between properties which correspond to convex regions of conceptual space, and hence can potentially be represented by prototypes, and concepts which are constructed as combinations of properties. However, in its original conception [32] prototype theory assumes that compound expressions such as not tall or orange & not red are also defined directly in terms of proximity to a (set of) prototypical element(s). In the label semantics framework this would correspond to the assumption that for every expression θ ∈ LE there exists prototypes P θ ⊆ Ω such that the set of elements which can be appropriately described by θ are exactly those elements which lie with a threshold of P θ i.e. N θ = {x:
}. We shall refer to this assumption as the compound prototypes hypothesis. Upon reflection the compound prototypes hypothesis reveals itself to be problematic in a number of ways: For example, consider negated expressions where θ ≡ ¬ϕ for some ϕ ∈ LE. In this case, the epistemic stance would require that N ¬ϕ should not overlap with N ϕ (i.e. ∀ 0 N ϕ ∩ N ¬ϕ = ∅), since an agent would never be willing to assert both 'x is ϕ'
and 'x is ¬ϕ' at any threshold level. This requirement, however, is inconsistent with the compound prototypes hypothesis. To see this consider y ∈ P ¬ϕ and let d( y, P ϕ ), then y ∈ N ϕ and y ∈ N ¬ϕ and hence N ϕ ∩ N ¬ϕ ⊇ {y} = ∅. In other words, if ¬ϕ is defined in terms of the distance from a set of prototypes P ¬ϕ then it will always be possible to select a threshold sufficiently large that P ¬ϕ and N ϕ overlap. Another difficulty with the compound prototypes hypothesis arises when considering conjunctions where θ ≡ ϕ ∧ ψ . If we take the view that an agent would only be willing to assert 'x is ϕ ∧ ψ ' if they are willing to independently assert both 'x is ϕ' and 'x is ψ ' then we should assume that ∀ 0 N ϕ∧ψ ⊆ N ϕ ∩ N ψ . However, suppose we consider a simple scenario where Ω = R, d(x, y) = x − y (Euclidean distance), P ϕ = {a} and P ψ = {b} where b > a. We might think of ϕ and ψ as representing imprecise numbers about a and about b respectively. In this context it would be rather natural to assume that P ϕ∧ψ = {c} where a < c < b. However, selecting 0 < <
we have that N ϕ ∩ N ψ = ∅ while N ϕ∧ψ ⊇ {c} = ∅, so that N ϕ∧ψ N ϕ ∩ N ψ . It should be noted that the requirement ∀ 0 N ϕ∧ψ ⊆ N ϕ ∩ N ψ is only valid since ϕ ∧ ψ is a true conjunctive. In natural language it is often the case that compound expressions which would appear to be conjunctions from a syntactic perspective, do not semantically correspond to classical conjunctions. For example, an expressions such as small elephant, while appearing to be in the form of a conjunction, clearly does not refer to elements of a domain which can be both independently referred to as being small and as being an elephant. Here the label small is in some sense secondary to the label elephant, whereby the latter identifies the context in which the former is defined. In a recent paper Freund [10] refers to this ordering of properties in the definition of a concept as determination. This notion would also seem to be relevant to the type of expressions studied in Hampton [18] , where experimental results suggest that descriptions such as office furniture are not treated as classical conjunctions. A detailed treatment of such expressions is, however, beyond the scope of this paper and the question of how to extend label semantics so as to include them remains to be explored in future work.
Adopting the compound prototypes hypothesis also requires us to consider how an agent could determine the prototypes P θ for every expression θ ∈ LE. In the label semantics model the implicit assumption is that for the basic labels L i ∈ LA, P i would be determined by a learning process involving interaction and communication with other agents. Using compound prototypes could potentially provide an agent with more flexible and relevant concept definitions if they could base their choice of prototypes on actual experience of language use. The difficulty here, however, is the potentially huge amounts of data required to determine P θ for every semantically distinct expression θ ∈ LE. For instance, if |LA| = n then there 2 2 n semantically distinct expressions in LE. For an agent to obtain specific data on the use of each of these would seem to be infeasible even for moderately large n. Consequently, it would seem likely that to some extent agents would need to define P θ for compound expression θ based on the prototypes of its component expressions. In effect this would require some variant of the functionality assumption that for each θ ∈ LE there is a prototype generating function g θ : 2 Ω × · · · × 2 Ω → 2 Ω according to which P θ = g θ (P i : L i ∈ LA). A special case of functionality would then be full prototype compositionality whereby generating functions g ∧ : 2 Ω × 2 Ω → 2 Ω , g ∨ : 2 Ω × 2 Ω → 2 Ω and g ¬ : 2 Ω → 2 Ω would be defined, according to which P θ∧ϕ = g ∧ (P θ , P ϕ ), P θ∨ϕ = g ∨ (P θ , P ϕ ) and P ¬θ = g ¬ (P θ ). Now aside from the difficulty of defining these generating functions in an intuitive manner, as discussed at length in Lawry [22] , it is difficult to see what advantages as a representa-tion framework a functional approach to prototype generation has over the kind of recursive definition of neighbourhoods described in Section 5.
Conclusions
We have argued that concept vagueness in natural language is a manifestation of uncertainty about the appropriate use of labels, which naturally arises as a result of the distributed and example based manner in which language is learnt. For this reason we adopt an epistemic viewpoint according to which the uncertainty associated with vague concepts is quantified by a measure of belief that the relevant labels or expressions are appropriate to describe a given example, and where appropriateness is governed by the emergent conventions of language use. The label semantics framework has then been introduced to provide a formal calculus for appropriateness measures of this kind.
Prototype theory is an effective tool by which we can understand the role of similarity and typicality in the definition of natural categories. The use of uncertain thresholds on the distance between elements and prototypes in order to define boundaries for labels provides a clear link between prototype theory and the epistemic view of vagueness, as well as providing an intuitive interpretation of appropriateness measures. This prototype model can be understood from two perspectives characterised by the random sets D x and N θ respectively. For an element x ∈ Ω, D x identifies those labels in LA with prototypes sufficiently close (i.e. within ) to x for them to be deemed appropriate descriptions of x. On the other hand, for a given expression θ the neighbourhood N θ contains those elements for which θ is an appropriate description.
Both approaches provide characterisations of appropriateness measures as single point coverage functions of random sets.
Intuitively, an agent would focus on D x when attempting to identify appropriate descriptions of a specific instance that they are presented with. Alternatively, the agent would focus on N θ when making inferences about the underlying domain Ω, given an assertion 'x is θ '.
By allowing different distance functions and thresholds for each label in LA we can model the semantic dependence between labels by a joint distribution on the cross product space of threshold random variables. In this paper we have discussed in detail two specific types of semantic dependence each of which results in a particular selection function for mass values. These are total dependence where all threshold variables and distance metrics coincide and total independence where all threshold variable are statistically independent. The semantic dependence being modelled here is based on the relationship between the characteristics being described by the various labels, as represented by different conceptual spaces. So for the consonant (dependent) model all labels describe the same characteristic, while for the independent model all labels describe different completely independent characteristics. Intermediate cases of dependence may not result in a selection function and consequently the resulting calculus for appropriateness measures will not be functional.
As already mentioned in Section 5.4.3 one of the most interesting and promising areas to be explored as part of future studies are the richer models of semantic dependence allowed within the general framework proposed in Section 5.4. The use of graphical approaches such as Bayesian networks to model the joint distribution on threshold variables, while not necessarily resulting in a functional calculus, may provide computationally tractable methods for evaluating appropriateness measures. Another potential avenue for research is the development of rule-based methods incorporating the label semantics prototype theory. In this case new rule-learning methods could be investigated which combine clustering algorithms with label semantics to provide the definition of natural description labels.
